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CONFUSING SIGNALS FROM THE BURGER
COURT: JUDICIAL REFINEMENT OF
PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Americans have witnessed a proliferation of state
and federal legislation, unprecedented in both scope and volume. The
result of such legislative activity has been to greatly increase the
number of private individuals who, injured by a violation of a particu-
lar statute, have sought judicial determination of their legal rights and
liabilities. In many instances citizens have requested that courts imply
a cause of action for the violation. Many statutes are enacted to protect
essentially private rights without any provision for recovery for those
members of the public most affected by the violations. This has pro-
duced a continuing problem for the courts and resolution of the prob-
lem has produced unclear judicial guidelines. For example, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,1
sounded like a tired parent whose child kept getting him out of bed for
another drink of water when he wrote: "Once again, we are called
upon to decide whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one. During this term alone, we have been asked
to undertake this task no less than five times in cases in which we have
granted certiorari."2 This comment explores the propriety of inferring
private causes of action in tort from statutes not specifically authorizing
such actions. An examination of the evolving law in this area with ma-
jor focus on developments in the last several years will be made.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Standards for Implication
In the process of creating judicial remedies for violations of stat-
utes, the Supreme Court has announced certain requirements for the
1. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
2. Id. at 562. The five cases referred to by Justice Rehnquist are: Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979);
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 439 U.S. 959 (1979).
1
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implication of a private cause of action. First, the plaintiff must be a
member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.3 Sec-
ond, implication of a cause of action must further the legislature's pur-
pose in enacting the statute so that courts should consider whether
legislative history supports such an implication.4 Third, the penalties
or remedies expressly provided under the statute must be inadequate to
assure its complete effectiveness.'
The current standards for implication are a product of past judi-
cial development of implied private causes of action. To understand
the law in this area, a brief review of the historical development of the
standards is essential.
B. Member of the Classfor Whose Beneft the Statute was Enacted
The doctrine of implied private rights of action was established in
Texas & Pacfc Railway v. Rigsby,6 where the United States Supreme
Court found that the existence of dangerous conditions causing injury
to a railroad employee were a direct violation of the Federal Safety
Appliance Act.' The Court stated that when disregard of a statutory
command results in damage to a party "for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in
default is implied ... ."8
This principle suggested that a federal private right of action might
be implied for anyone injured as a result of a statutory violation.9 The
only apparent qualification "upon the implication process at this time
was the requirement that the right claimed be derived from a statute
enacted for the especial benefit of the plaintiff."' 0
With the expansion of federal legislation and the resultant increase
in the federal case load, it became clear that the Rigsby standard was
3. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 398 U.S. 191 (1967); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rig-
sbey, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
4. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United
States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); Machinists v. Central Airlines, 372 U.S. 682 (1963); Hewitt-Robbins,
Inc. v. Eastern Freightways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84 (1962).
5. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964).
6. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
7. 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970).
8. 241 U.S. at 39 (cited in Note, Implied Private Rights of Action-The Cort v Ash Test-
Interaction of 'special.Beneficiary" andLegislative Intent, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1173, 1174 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Private Rights of Action]).
9. This principle has been adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
10. Private Rights of Action, supra note 8, at 1174.
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not sufficiently stringent to effectively limit access to the federal courts.
A complex, rigorous analysis of the statutes underlying the claims of
implied private rights of action was needed."
For a time, the Court indicated that implied remedies might be
restricted to statutes manifesting congressional intent to provide a pri-
vate right of action,'2 but it reversed this trend in the landmark deci-
sion of .J . Case Co. v. Borak.t3 The Court granted a private cause of
action to a stockholder alleging a deprivation of pre-emptive rights by
corporate use of a false and misleading proxy statement. 14
Upon finding the intended investors "especial beneficiaries" of the
Act, the Court stated that this alone was insufficient to trigger a private
right of action under the Act. Nevertheless, it was also found that the
purpose of the Act could not be achieved without implying a private
right of action because time and resources did not permit the Securities
and Exchange Commission to adequately examine the accuracy of the
overwhelming number of proxy statements that the Commission re-
ceived annually.'5 Therefore, the Court determined that "private en-
forcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to the
Commission action."' 6 The congressional purpose of protecting inves-
tors from false and misleading proxy statements would be jointly
achieved by Commission action and private suits. 7 Courts have a
11. Id. at 1174-75.
12. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1963); T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United
States, 359 U.S. 464,471 (1959); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,457 (1957).
13. 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (cited in 31 VAND. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (1978)).
14. Borak based his suit primarily upon § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), which had as its chief purpose the protection of investors from deceptive
pratices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange
or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in thepublic interest orfor theprotection of investors,
to solicit or permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in
respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section
781 of this title.
Id. (emphasis added). See 377 U.S. at 432.
15. 377 U.S. at 432.
The Commission advises that it examines over 2,000 proxy statements annually and each
of them must necessarily be expedited. Time does not permit an independent examina-
tion of the facts set out in the proxy material and this results in the commission's accept-
ance of the representations contained therein at their face value, unless contrary to other
material on file with it. . . .We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it
is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose.
Id.
16. Id.
17. The Court, in support of its decision to permit private actions, discussed the "potential
3
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duty, therefore, to make such remedies available as are necessary to
implement congressional purposes.' 8 Whether or not a statute creates a
cause of action will depend on whether the plaintiff is a member of the
class of individuals which the statute was designed to protect.
C. Furthering the Purposes of the Statute
The primary inquiry under the "purpose" test is whether the im-
plication of a private cause of action would promote any of the princi-
pal objectives for which Congress enacted the statute.' 9 Congressional
purpose was emphasized in Allen v. State Board of Elections,20 where
the Court determined that the purpose of the Voting Rights Act of
196521 might be frustrated "if each citizen were required to depend
solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral,"22 an office with limited staff and time. Therefore, permitting a
private right of action would be consistent with the broad purpose of
the Act-ending racial discrimination in the voting process.
The effect of Allen's broad holding produced a flood of litigants
seeking relief and the Court retreated from that decision in National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. NationalAssociation of Railroad Passengers
(Amtrak) .23 In Amtrak, the National Association of Railroad Passen-
gers brought suit to enjoin the discontinuance of certain passenger
trains, alleging that the discontinuance would violate the Railway Pas-
senger Act24 in which the plaintiff claimed an implied private power of
enforcement.2 5 The Court viewed Section 307(a) as creating a public
cause of action maintainable by the Attorney General. The only pri-
unfairness of relegating plaintiffs to the state courts." Private Rights ofAction, supra note 8, at
1175. "If the law of the state happened to attach no responsibility to the use of misleading proxy
statements, the whole purpose of the section might be frustrated." 377 U.S. at 434-35. The Court
observed that it has the duty to be alert in order to provide the necessary remedies to render
effective the congressional purpose and thereby, in this instance, supplement commission action.
18. 377 U.S. at 433; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Wyandotte Transp.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
19. Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial In.
sight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 441, 445 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Phenomenon of Private Actions]. See National R.R. Passengers Corp. v. Na-
tional Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 461-66 (1974); Remar v. Clayton Security Corp., 81
F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D. Mass. 1949).
20. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). See also Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031,
1034 (9th Cir. 1970); Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv., 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1970).
22. 393 U.S. at 556.
23. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
24. 45 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970).
25. 414 U.S. at 458-65.
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vate cause of action was explicitly limited to labor agreements. 6 Am-
trak .thus established a "presumption against implication when a
remedial scheme is expressly provided by Congress, rebuttable only by
a showing of affirmative congressional intent to provide a private rem-
edy."'27 Although Amtrak failed to develop a rigid test for implication
of a private cause of action, it focused the inquiry upon three principal
factors: congressional purpose, legislative history, and statutory con-
struction.2
The congressional purpose outlined in a statute may not always be
achieved by the exercise of the statutory remedies provided. In such
situations, courts have assumed the duty to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make the congressional purpose effective-even to the
extent of implying private rights of action.
D. Legislative Intent
In applying the legislative intent test, a "court seeks to uncover any
expressions of congressional attitude favoring or disfavoring private
causes of action."29 One writer has argued that the approach employed
by a court with respect to the significance of an absence of legislative
expression of intent regarding private actions is a function of the court's
predisposition on whether to permit a private cause of action.30
There has been little unanimity among courts in the approach
taken to discover legislative intent. The Ninth Circuit, in Burke v.
Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 3 ' presumed a power to grant private
remedies absent other congressional intent.32 The Tenth Circuit took a
26. Id. at 457.
In light of the language and legislative history of § 307(a), we read it as creating a
probable cause of action, maintainable by the Attorney General, to enforce the duties
and responsibilities imposed by the Act. The only private cause of action created by that
provision, however, is explicitly limited to "a case involving a labor agreement."
Id.
27. See 31 VAND L. REV. 1513, 1516 (1978).
28. Id.
29. Phenomenon ofPrivateActions, supra note 19, at 441. See Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S.
134, 140-41 (1964) (the remedy provided by the statute is intended as the exclusive means of
enforcing labor elections law); Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 380-82 (1958)
(same for antitrust statute); Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297, 306
(1943) (same for Railway Labor Act); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 999-1000
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (private causes of action not intended by Congress under the Federal Trade
Commission Act).
30. Phenomenon of Private 4ctions, supra note 19, at 443.
31. 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. "In the absence of a clear congressional intent to the contrary, the courts are free to
fashion appropriate civil remedies based on the violation of penal statutes where necessary to
1980]
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different approach in Chavez v. Freshpict Foods, Inc. ,33 where it pre-
sumed that no such power exists without congressional authority.34
The Chavez approach requires an affirmative expression of congres-
sional intent before courts may grant remedies unexpressed in the stat-
ute, while the Burke view assumes the existence of judicial power to
create remedies unless restricted by an affirmative act of Congress."
In several cases, the Supreme Court has refused to imply remedies
by narrowly construing the language of the statutes and the intent of
the drafters. In TIME., Inc. v. United States,36 the Court declined to
imply a private cause of action in favor of a shipper seeking to recover
unreasonable charges made on past shipments from a motor carrier. It
did so on the ground that the provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act relating respectively to rail and water carriers37 allowed an injured
shipper the right to sue while the structure and history of the Act regu-
lating motor carriers38 contained no comparable provision. The Court
held that, given this omission in the statutory language, it could not
find congressional intent to grant the requested remedy. 9
In discussing legislative intent, the Court has looked to the legisla-
tive history of a statute to find compatibility or preclusion of an implied
right of action. This judicial search has produced two methods for
measuring intent. First, courts have held that the discovery of express
remedies infers the intentional exclusion of others. Absent a negative
intention, the second method allows a court to fashion a remedy consis-
tent with and in furtherance of the purpose of the statute.
ensure the full effectiveness of the congressional purpose." Id. at 1033; see Reitmeister v.
Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d Cir. 1947).
33. 456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
34. This court will not fashion civil remedies from federal regulatory statutes except
where. . . the intent of Congress to create private rights can be found in the statute or m
its legislative history. Had the Congress intended to create private causes of action and
private remedies, it was fully capable of directly and clearly so providing.
Id. at 894-95.
35. Phenomenon ofPrivateActions,.rupra note 19, at 442. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,
69 F. Supp. 512, 512-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946), holds that in the absence of a contrary expression of
intent, Congress intended to allow private civil causes of action by individuals injured by violation
of a criminal or regulatory statute.
36. 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (cited in Comment, Emerging Standardsfor ImpliedActions Under
Federal Statutes, 9 J.L. REF. 294, 301 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Emerging Standards/or Imlled
Actions].
37. 49 U.S.C. §§ 8, 908(c) (1970).
38. Id. § 316(b), 316(d).
39. 414 U.S. at 456-61.
[Vol. 16:91
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E. Existing State Remedies
In cases concerning private causes of action for damages, courts
have considered a fourth test: the effectiveness of existing state reme-
dies as an alternative to finding an implied federal remedy.40 When no
compelling federal interest is involved, courts have treated the availa-
bility of a private state remedy as a factor militating against implication
of federal causes of action.4 1 One court42 has warned against the impli-
cation of federal remedies when satisfactory state remedies exist,
thereby concluding that Congress impliedly considered the state rem-
edy to be insufficient.43
The Supreme Court in Borak" found an implied private action
under the federal securities laws, despite the existence of state reme-
dies.45 The Court's decision in Borak has been called a "supplantation
of state law without a clear legislative expression of intent to achieve
that end."4 6 One critic has commented: "In view of the absence of
congressional purpose to displace established corporation law, it is im-
portant that the broadly worded decision of the Court be restricted to
its proper sphere-the effective enforcement of [the proxy section]."'4 7
This rationale is appropriate "whenever courts ignore alternative re-
courses available to a plaintiff-whether to state judicial or federal ad-
ministrative remedies-in implying a federal private cause of action. 48
The four tests discussed above overlap to some extent in definition
and application. It is difficult to distinguish the "legislative intent" test
from the "purpose of the act" test. The latter is also somewhat indistin-
guishable from the "class of plaintiff"' criteria. Nevertheless, the focus
40. Phenomenon of Private Actions, supra note 19, at 449. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
41. Phenomenon of Private Actions, supra note 19, at 449. See Consolidated Freightways,
Inc. v. United Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543, 544, 546 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905
(1955).
42. Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
43. "[J]udicial implication of ancillary Federal remedies is a matter to be treated with care,
lest a carefully erected legislative scheme-often the result of a delicate balance of Federal and
state, public and private interests-be skewed by the courts, albeit inadvertently." Id. at 989.
44. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
45. Id. at 434-35.
46. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964); Comment, SEC Proxy Regulations:
Private Enforcement and Federal Remedies, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1336, 1338 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as SEC Proxy Regulations].
47. Phenomenon of Private Actions, supra note 19, at 449.
48. See SEC Proxy Regulations, supra note 46, at 1338.
1980]
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ofjudicial concern in recent cases involving the issue of implied private
rights centers upon these four criteria.
In considering whether an implied private right is appropriate,
courts recognize the existence of available state remedies. Where fed-
eral implication of private rights would be incompatible with state rem-
edies, deference should be given to the state remedy absent an
overriding federal interest. The inquiry concerns the propriety of infer-
ring a cause of action based solely on federal law if the action is one
traditionally relegated to state law.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Cort v. Ash 9 is the first decision of the Supreme Court to establish
comprehensive standards to be used in determining the propriety of
inferring a civil cause of action from a criminal or regulatory statute.
The guidelines announced in Cort represent an effort to unify the tests
employed in past decisions.5 0 Cort involved a stockholder derivative
suit against the directors of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation."1
The Court outlined the relevant factors in determining if implica-
tion of a private cause of action was consistent with a particular federal
statute:
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted . . . that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one?. . . Third, is it consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to
imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?. . . And finally, is the
cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law. . . so
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based
49. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
50. Emerging Standards for ImpliedAeions, supra note 36, at 302.
51. The stockholder complained that Bethlehem had expended corporate funds for partisan
political advertisements in violation of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C.
§ 610 (Supp. I 1972) (repealed 1976). The statute prohibits certain corporate expenditures for
federal political campaigns and provides criminal sanctions for violations. The following penal-
ties are prescribed: (I) a $5,000 maximum fine against any corporation or labor union violating
the Act; (2) a $1,000 maximum fine and/or one year imprisonment for every officer or director of
any corporation and every officer of any labor organization who consents to any contribution or
expenditure by the corporation or labor organization and any person who accepts or receives any
contribution; and (3) a $10,000 maximum fine and/or two years maximum imprisonment if the
violation was willful. Id.
Ash sought immediate and prospective relief against further corporate expenditures in politi-
cal campaigns and compensatory and punitive damages in favor of the corporation.
[Vol. 16:91
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solely on federal law?52
Ash based his suit upon the belief that it is inappropriate for cor-
porations to use corporate funds for political contributions without
stockholder approval.53 He argued that the protective attitude shown
toward stockholders "proves that the statute provides stockholders with
a federal right not to have corporation funds contributed for political
campaign purposes."54 The Court countered this basis for action with
a discussion of the legislative history of the Campaign Act,. concluding
that the protection of stockholders is merely a secondary purpose of the
statute. 5 The primary purpose of the statute is the elimination of the
influence of corporate contributions upon federal elections. Because
the legislation was not primarily concerned with the relations between
the shareholders and the corporation, Ash did not belong to a class for
whose special benefit the statute was enacted. 6 Alternatively, the
Court found it appropriate for state law to govern Ash's claims. 7
Cort combined the various factors at which the Supreme Court
had looked in previous decisions, emphasizing the importance of all
four tests. Although the Court based its decision on the plaintiff's fail-
ure to qualify for a private cause of action under the four criteria, the
Cort decision modified the standards in several ways.
With respect to the "especial benefit" test, Cort imposed more
stringent standards upon those seeking an implied civil action. The
four criteria address the concern that implied remedies had become too
accessible to plaintiffs with trifling claims under the intended benefici-
ary approach. By denying implied causes of action to incidental statu-
tory beneficiaries, the especial benefit standard curtails the criticism
that the implication of private remedies constitutes judicial encroach-
ment on legislative power.58
In addressing the role of legislative intent as an indicator of the
52. 422 U.S. at 79.
53. Id. at 80.
54. Id. at 81; Emerging Standards for Implied Aeions, supra note 36, at 306.
55. 422 U.S. at 81.
56. Id. at 82; Emerging Standardsfor Implied Actions, supra note 36, at 307. The Court
added that in those situations in which we have inferred a federal private cause of action not
expressly provided for, there has generally been a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff,
e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or a persuasive legisla-
tive scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the defendant class in a
particular regard, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
57. The stockholder/corporation relationship is traditionally relegated to state law except
"where federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of the directors with respect to stock-
holders .. " 422 U.S. at 84.
58. Emerging Standardsfor ImpliedActions, supra note 36, at 309. "[I1mplied remedies will
1980]
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legislature's denial or allowance of a private action, the Court indicated
that an intention to permit or create a private remedy need not be
shown in an area where it is evident that a class has been endowed with
such a remedy by federal law. 9 By limiting the scope of the search for
an indication of legislative intent, the Court accepted, at least in part,
the view that implication is permissible in the absence of a positive
indication of legislative intent.6 0
An implied civil remedy must be "consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme."' 6 1 One commentator has viewed
the Cort decision as requiring courts to assess "the legislative purposes,
the need for protecting the discretionary powers of agencies vested with
enforcement capabilities, and the potential impact of private civil ac-
tions on the overall scheme."62
State concern is noted in Cort by the recognition of instances in
which federal interest overrides state law concerns. In Borak, the
Court approved the inference of a civil cause of action because Con-
gress clearly intended the statute to be "an intrusion of federal law"
into a state law area. 3 The interest in a federal remedy predominates
where the federal statute creates a new liability for which there exists
no analagous state cause of action.64
The Cort tests determined whether the plaintiff may be granted an
implied cause of action. 65 The decision, however, did not finally re-
solve the question of whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
not expressly providing one. The Court has since reviewed the ques-
tion no less than five times.
66
In Cannon v. University of Chicago 67 an applicant for admission
brought suit against the university's medical school, claiming that she
was denied admission because of the university's sexual bias. Cannon,
although invoking other statutory grounds, 68 based her cause of action
only be found in favor of plaintiffs whose interests are shown to be the primary concern of Con-
gress in enacting the legislation." Id.
59. 422 U.S. at 81 (cited in Emerging Standards for ImpliedActions, supra note 36, at 310-11).
60. Emerging Standardsfor ImpliedActions, supra note 36, at 310-11.
61. 422 U.S. at 78.
62. See Emerging Standardsfor ImpliedActions, supra note 36, at 313.
63. 422 U.S. at 66, 85.
64. See Emerging Standardsfor ImpliedActions, supra note 36, at 316.
65. Id.
66. Note 2 supra.
67. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
68. Cannon brought separate actions against both schools alleging violations of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970); Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1683 (1976); and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976).
[Vol. 16:91
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss1/4
CONFUSING SIGNALS
primarily on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.69 Each
agency empowered to dispense funds for educational purposes was au-
thorized by Title IX to promulgate appropriate enforcing regulations.7 °
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare [HEW] did so, es-
tablishing enforcement provisions through its Office of Civil Rights.71
Nowhere in the statute or in the regulations did HEW or Congress ex-
plicitly provide for a private right of action against a violator of Title
IX. 72 The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's finding that
section 901 of the statute did not provide an implied private remedy.73
The Court of Appeals concluded that the Act established a procedure
for termination of federal financial support for institutions violating
sections 901 and 902 and that Congress intended that remedy to be the
exclusive means of enforcement.74
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cannon could maintain
her lawsuit despite the absence of any express authorization in the lan-
guage of Title IX.75 Before deciding that Congress intended to make a
remedy available to a special class, the Court reasoned that congres-
sional intent must be examined using the four criteria announced in
Cort 76
Utilizing the four tests, the Court first found that the class mem-
bership test was satisfied.77 In applying the second test, consideration
of legislative history, the Court found that Title IX was patterned after
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78 Neither statute expressly
69. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970). "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
70. Id. § 1682 (cited in Comment, Implication of a Private Right of Action Under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 772 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Implication
Under Title IX]).
71. 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1977). The system of complaint adopts three methods of enforcement:
(1) remedial action by the Director necessary to overcome the effects of such discrimination; (2)
affirmative action by the educational institution to correct the effects of conditions which produced
limited participation; and (3) self-evaluation conducted by the institution evaluating current poli-
cies and practices and their possible discriminatory effects. Id.
72. Implication Under Title IX, supra note 70, at 772.
73. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1977).
74. Id. at 1081.
75. 441 U.S. at 717.
76. Id. at 688. The Court noted that violation of a federal statute resulting in harm to some
person does not automatically give rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person. Id.
77. Id. at 694. "Title IX explicitly confers a benefit on persons discriminated against on the
basis of sex, and petitioner is clearly a member of that class for whose special benefit the statute
was enacted." Id.
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to -6 (1976). The enforcement procedures of Title VI are incorpo-
rated into the regulations for Title IX.
1980]
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mentions a private remedy, but the drafters of Title IX explicitly as-
sumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title VI had been
during the previous eight years.7 9 The Court also noted that Congress,
in passing section 718 of the Education Amendments,80 authorized fed-
eral courts to award fees to the prevailing party in private actions
brought against local educational agencies. The Court reasoned that
the provision allowing the United States to enforce Title VI in the con-
text of elementary and secondary education presumes the availability
of private suits to enforce Title VI.81
The third factor was satisfied because implication of a private rem-
edy would not frustrate the legislative purposes of avoiding federal use
of resources to support discrimination and effectively protecting citi-
zens against such practices. Furthermore, an implication of a private
right would enhance HEW's efforts in achieving the statutory pur-
poses.8 2
In discussing the fourth criterion, the availability of state remedies,
the Court stated that the federal courts and Federal Government had
been the "primary and powerful reliances in protecting citizens against
such [invidious] discrimination. . . .Moreover, it is the expenditure of
federal funds that provides the justification for this statutory prohibi-
tion."".
The Cort criteria were alive and well until the Supreme Court's
decision in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redingon.84 The issue before the
Court was whether the customers of security brokerage firms, which are
required to file certain financial reports with regulatory authorities,85
79. 441 U.S. at 696.
80. 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. IV 1974).
81. Id. See 441 U.S. at 699.
82. 441 U.S. at 703.
83. Id. at 708-09. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1928).
In dissent, Justice Powell expressed his fear that the Court's application of the Cort analysis
was a threat to the concept of separation of powers in that Corl "too readily permits courts to
override the decision of Congress not to create a private action." 441 U.S. at 740-41 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Powell noted that before Cori, the Court upheld the implication of private causes of
action derived from federal statutes in only three limited sets of circumstances. These include
racial discrimination in the selling of property, Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); the leas-
ing of property, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); and employment, Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975). See 422 U.S. at 736. Powell expressed alarm at the
increase in the lower courts' recognition of implied private causes of action on the basis of a
consideration of the Cori factors. 441 U.S. at 740-41 (Powell, J., dissenting).
84. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1940).
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof. . . and every broker or
dealer registered pursuant to. . .this title, shall make, keep and preserve for such peri-
ods, such accounts, correspondence. . . and other records, and make such reports, as the
[Vol. 16:91
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have an implied cause of action for damages against accountants who
audit such reports based on misstatements contained therein.
The Court limited its inquiry to whether Congress intended to cre-
ate, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.8 6 In
view of the fact that the legislative history of the 1934 Act was silent on
the issue of whether a private right of action for damages should be
available under section 17(a), the Court looked to the plain language of
the provision. Section 17(a) requires broker-dealers and others to keep
such records and file such reports as the Commission may prescribe.87
In the Court's analysis, several factors played an important role in
the decision against implying a private action. The Court noted that in
past judicial discoveries of private rights, "the statute in question at
least prohibited certain conduct or created federal rights in favor of
private parties. 88 However, section 17(a) neither confers rights on pri-
vate parties nor proscribes any conduct as unlawful. Also, the fact that
section 17(a) is surrounded by provisions of the 1934 Act that explicitly
grant private causes of action8 9 prompted the Court to note that "when
Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it knew how to
do so and did so expressly." 9°
The Court felt no compulsion to subject section 17(a) to the other
Cort criteria based upon a failure to find that the plaintiff was a mem-
ber of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted and a legisla-
tive intent to create such a remedy in the legislative history.91 Justice
Rehnquist qualifed the applicability of the Cort test by holding that the
four factors were not entitled to equal weight.92 In this way the Court
appeared to be modifying the Cort approach.
If Touche Ross represents the first step away from Cort, an even
Commission by its rules and regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
86. 442 U.S. at 568.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
88. 442 U.S. at 569.
89. Id. at 571.
90. Id. at 579.
91. Id. at 579-80.
92. Id. at 575-76.
It is true that in Cori v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it considered "relevant"
in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing
one. But the Court did not decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal
weight. . . . Indeed, the first three factors discussed in Cort-the language and focus of
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greater departure was made in Transamerica Mortgage Adlsors, Inc. v.
Lewis.93 That case involved the creation of a private cause of action
for the victims of violations of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.94
With respect to section 215 of the Act, the Court found that the
statutory language itself "fairly implies a right to specific and limited
relief in a federal court.""5 The Court rejected the argument that sec-
tion 206 of the Act created a private cause of action. That section made
it unlawful for an investment advisor "to employ any device. . . or to
engage in any transaction. . . which operates as a fraud or deceit upon
any client or prospective client. ... "96 The Court viewed the statu-
tory language as proscribing certain conduct but not as creating or al-
tering any civil liabilities. The Court noted that other provisions of the
statute impose criminal penalties for wilfull violations, authorize the
Securities and Exchange Commission to bring actions to compel com-
pliance, and impose administrative sanctions. "In view of these express
provisions for enforcing the duties imposed by section 206, it is highly
improbable that 'Congress absentmindedly forgot to mention an in-
tended private action.' "97
Although the respondent urged the Court to include an analysis of
the fourth Cort criterion (alternative state remedy) and not to end upon
a sole analysis of congressional intent, the Court followed its previous
decision in Touche Ross.98 Employing the criterion of congressional
intent as an indicator of the creation of private rights, the Court found
that the "mere fact that a statute was designed to protect advisers' cli-
ents does not require the implication of a private cause of action for
damages on their behalf."99
The result of the most recent decisions by the Court in the area of
implied private rights does not indicate that Cort has been discarded.
Rather, a judicial refinement of those factors has taken place. The four
factors are not equal in weight, nor does the presence of one or two of
the factors result in a favorable finding for the plaintiff. This refine-
ment has resulted in a greater emphasis being placed on the factors
determinative of legislative intent such as language, the statutory pur-
93. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 to -15 (1940). See 444 U.S. at 12, 13.
95. 444 U.S. at 18.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1940).
97. 444 U.S. at 20 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting)).
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pose and legislative history. The post-Cort decisions indicate that leg-
islative intent expressed in the statute's language carries the most
weight in the determination of implied rights.
An explanation for the shift in emphasis by the Court is its con-
cern for the "unbalancing" of the balance of powers, as expressed by
Justice Powell in his dissent in Cannon, which became the foundation
of the majority opinion in Touche Ross. ' °° This shift in focus has not
gone unnoticed, as indicated by the recent ruling of one circuit court
upon the implied private right of action of a discharged employee in
retaliation for reporting safety violations to OSHA.' °'
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court since Cort has clearly taken a new direction in
implying private causes of action. The Court has adopted a judicially
conservative philosophy, deferring to congressional intent as expressed
in legislative history. The implication of this new direction enables the
Court to rule that expressly provided remedies are the exclusive reme-
dies available to injured persons. The direction in which the Court is
headed was announced by Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents.12
I dissent from today's holding which judicially creates a dam-
age remedy not provided for by the Constitution and not en-
acted by Congress. We would more surely preserve the
important values of the doctrine of separation of powers-and
perhaps get a better result-by recommending a solution to
the Congress as the branch of government in which the Con-
stitution has vested the legislative power. Legislation is the
business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and compe-
tence for that task-as we do not.'0 3
100. 442 U.S. at 579.
[W]e are not at liberty to legislate. If there is to be a federal damage remedy under these
circumstances, Congress must provide it. "[I]t is not for us to fill any hiatus Congress has
left in this area. ... [I]f Congress intends such a federal right of action, it is well
aware of how it may effectuate that intent.
Id. (citations omitted).
101. "The dispositive question" is not whether a private right of action under section 11 (c) is
desirable, but "whether Congress intended to create any such remedy. Having answered that
question in the negative, our inquiry is at an end. Accordingly, we hold that there is no private
right of action under OSHA. ... Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1980) (cita-
tions omitted).
102. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
103. Id. at 411-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (cited in McMahon & Rodos, JudicialImplications
of Private Causes of Actionr Reappraisal & Retrenchment, 80 DicK. L. REv. 167, 191 (1975)).
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The past five years of judicial refinement of the standards for im-
plication of implied private rights of action provides the injured plain-
tiff with less of an opportunity for success than he previously enjoyed.
If the statute under which he seeks relief is accompanied by an expres-
sion of legislative intent which justifies an implication of a private
cause of action, his success is still assured.
Douglas K. Pehrson
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